No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/09/15 : LOC-HAK-33-1-12-0 AR MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

NSA review completed

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. KISSINGER

FROM:

JOHN HOLDRIDGE Acan

SUBJECT:

MORI/CDF C05141341 CIA Weekly Infiltration and Logistics Report

The following is a summary of CIA's April 17, 1973 report on Communist infiltration and logistics movements during the past week (Tab A).

- -- Heavy southbound truck traffic continues from North Vietnam into Laos. The number of trucks moving through the Ban Karai Pass continues to be high and averaged 40 per day for the period April 9 15. (The DIA/CIA report of April 13 noted a daily average of nearly 54 a day from April 6 to 12.) West of the DMZ, sensors detected their highest number of trucks this dry season on April 11 when 42 vehicles were recorded moving south into Laos.
- -- Photography showed hundreds of vehicles moving south in southern Laos during the week.
- -- There has been heavy logistics activity in southern North Vietnam, particularly around Dong Hoi.
- -- There have been high levels of logistics activity in Quang Tri Province and the A Shau Valley area. Between 60 and 100 trucks were seen daily along Route 9 (Quang Tri Province) from April 7 to 10. Survivors from the ICCS helicopter shootdown on April 7 in northwest Quang Tri Province reported that "the entire area was one massive staging area for future operations." Subsequently intercepted NVA messages directed that logistics activities be masked from ICCS inspection teams.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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- -- No regular infiltration groups have been detected entering the pipeline since March II. Four small special-purpose groups have been detected in the pipeline, the first seen entering the system since March 27.
- -- As many as 20,000 men (in the 308th, 304th, and 312th Division) may have returned to North Vietnam from Quang Tri Province. Even with these withdrawals, however, Communist troop strength in MR-1 would remain comparable to the level at the beginning of the 1972 offensive. (Moreover, the withdrawn troops could be rapidly returned to MR-1.)